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From the Savannah to the Magistrate’s Court
The Roots of Criminal Justice in Evolved Human Psychology
Abstract: Recent research claims that criminal justice institutions have universal fea-
tures that are rooted in psychological mechanisms shaped by human evolution. In
this chapter, we review three core questions touching on this perspective: We exam-
ine thenotion that our evolvedpsychologyhas led to cross-culturally shared intuitions
about what constitutes a crime; we assess the extent to which arguments based on
behavioral game theory and evolutionary psychology can account for the emergence
of centralized punishment in complex societies; and examine procedural fairness as
a pivotal normative element of criminal justice across the world. We show substan-
tial cross-cultural variability in what is considered a crime, and propose a theoretical
perspective that recognizes change in the normative bases of cooperative behavior.
Also, we argue that seeing criminal justice primarily as a system that imposes costs
on freeriders may be incomplete. In particular, we highlight fair procedure and le-
gitimacy as core characteristics that distinguish institutionally anchored justice from
mere punishment.
1 Introduction
Wherever states emergedover thepast 4,000 years, institutionsdeveloped thatwe eas-
ily recognize as ‘criminal justice’: arrangements to deal with wrongs and deliver pun-
ishment. Examples include Ancient China, Babylon, India, Egypt, Classical Greece,
and the Incan, Mayan and Aztec Empires (Avalos 1994; Calhoun 1927; Doniger 1991;
Harper 1904; Johnson 1995; Krotz 2001; Lorton 1977). This universal formation of crim-
inal justice institutions in large-scale societies raises questions at the core of sociolog-
ical thinking. Why are some behaviors punishable and not others? How does punish-
ment contribute to social order, and why do societies have elaborate procedures to do
justice?
These questions are not new. Social theorists such as Hobbes ([1660] 1968), Locke
([1690] 1988), Beccaria ([1764], 1989), Mill ([1859] 1991) and Nozick (1974) have exten-
sively examined what behaviors should be punished, and how criminal justice con-
tributes to social order. One answer is based on social contract theory. It begins by
assuming that all individuals share fundamental rights to pursue their self-interests
such as life, liberty and property. In their search for a way to protect these rights, ra-
tional actors agree on a social contract in which centralized punishment is the main
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mechanism to enforce compliance with the other elements of the contract. Social con-
tract theory makes highly stylized assumptions about human nature, particularly in
its supposition that individuals are solitary beingswhoact rationally inpursuit of their
self-interest.
Recent scholarship has questioned whether these assumptions are realistic. Be-
havioral game theorists and evolutionary psychologists have argued that basic fea-
tures of criminal justice are deeply rooted in complex emotional and cognitive mecha-
nisms thatwere shapedduringhumanevolution. Their claimsarebold: Buckholtz and
Marois (2012:655), for example, maintain that “third-party punishment of norm viola-
tions [. . . ] is the cornerstone of modern systems of criminal justice”, while Petersen et
al. (2010:682) propose that “intuitions about modern mass-level criminal justice sys-
tems emerge from evolved mechanisms designed to operate in ancestral small-scale
societies”.
Supportive evidence comes from different disciplines. This includes behavioral
game theory experiments to determine the conditions for cooperative behavior in
groups (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2002; Gintis et al. 2008); evolutionary psychology
research on the roots of moral sentiments and punitive intuitions in the recurrent
problems of cooperation and freeriding in hunter-gatherer societies (e.g., Petersen et
al. 2010; Price, Cosmides, and Tooby 2002; Walsh 2000); and neuroscientiﬁc studies
on the brain circuitry involved in processes such as anger, revenge, norm compliance
and equity (e.g., Buckholtz and Marois 2012; McCullough, Kurzban, and Tabak 2013;
Spitzer et al. 2007). However, there have been few efforts to link ﬁndings from lab-
oratory and experimental research to the body of criminological knowledge about
criminal justice ‘in the wild’.
It is unclear to what extent an evolutionary approach can explain real-world fea-
tures of criminal justice. To shed some light on this issue, we review three issues that
we believe are critical for the viability of an evolutionary framework. First, we exam-
ine the claim that our evolved psychology has led to cross-culturally shared intuitions
about what constitutes a crime. We then assess the extent to which ﬁndings emerg-
ing from behavioral game theory can account for the emergence of centralized pun-
ishment in complex societies. Finally, we analyze how game theory and evolutionary
psychology may explain procedural fairness as a pivotal normative element of crimi-
nal justice across the world.
2 What is criminal law?
What makes a behavior a crime? There is disagreement within the social sciences
about the right answer to this question. The standard social science model (Tooby
and Cosmides 1992) assumes that perceptions of what a crime is varies strongly be-
tween societies. Durkheim ([1895] 2010), for example, argued that anything that vio-
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lates shared values can be seen as a crime. Similarly, sociological conﬂict theories ex-
pect substantial variation, although here the changing interests of the ruling classes
determine which behaviors become labeled as crimes (Quinney 1970).
Other theories predict that intuition about crime is highly similar across human
societies. Evolutionary theories, in particular, hold that criminal law is a social insti-
tution that builds on evolved psychological mechanisms designed to solve the prob-
lem of freeriding among genetically unrelated individuals (Petersen et al. 2010; Robin-
son, Kurzban, and Jones 2007). Accordingly, crime is seen as the behavior of exploita-
tive predators who have a preference for non-cooperative, short-sighted, coercive, and
egoistic strategies (Duntley and Shackelford 2008; Glenn, Kurzban, and Raine 2011;
Petersen et al. 2010:686; Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones 2007). Hence criminal law,
the argument goes, consists of punitive norms that protect a group against cheat-
ing and harm. In this vein, Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones (2007) maintain “that peo-
ple broadly share intuitions that serious wrongdoing should be punished and also
share intuitions about the relativeblameworthiness of different transgressions” across
cultures. Therefore, we should expect those behaviors that undermine cooperation
by violating rules of reciprocity and fairness to be universally punishable (Fehr and
Schmidt 1999). Criminologists Gottfredson and Hirschi identiﬁed this core as acts of
“force and fraud” (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990).
2.1 Cross-cultural similarities
How strong is the evidence that universal intuitions about wrongdoing shape a cross-
cultural consensus about what constitutes crime? Supportive ﬁndings come from sev-
eral strands of research, although there is a continuing lack of empirical work out-
side Western societies. First, several anthropological and criminological studies have
compared which behaviors are perceived as deserving of punishment across societies
(Hoebel 1967; Newman 1976; Newman 2010; Reichel 2002). Work by Newman (1976)
conducted in the early 1970s has remained an important standard in the ﬁeld. Compar-
ing India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, the United States and Yugoslavia, he found important
similarities in what is considered a crime across these cultures. In particular, physical
integrity andproperty are protected by legal norms in all studied societies, while there
ismore cross-cultural variation in the criminalizationof moral transgressions relating
to sexual behavior and religion.
Second, criminologists have studied agreement in estimates of a crime’s serious-
ness between societies and between individuals within a society (Stylianou 2003).
These studies suggest a very high between-individual agreement on the relative rank-
ing of different crimes (Robinson and Kurzban 2006). When one considers the ranking
of average scores between societies, a high correlation is also found for those crimes
where the victim suffers visible and unambiguous damage or injury (Newman and
Wiolfgang 1976). For such behaviors, the seriousness ranking mainly mirrors intu-
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itions about the size of the inﬂicted harm. Thus,murder, rape and robbery tend to rank
high, while simple theft and assault without serious injury rank low (Stylianou 2003).
A third group of studies have examined the factors that inﬂuence people’s intu-
itions about the proper punishment for wrongdoing. They often use vignettes andma-
nipulate salient elements of a criminal act (Carlsmith 2006; Crockett, Özdemir, and
Fehr 2014; Stylianou 2003). Most work in this respect has been done in Western so-
cieties, where ﬁndings suggest that subjects punish primarily on the basis of a retri-
bution principle. This means that punitive intuitions are for the most part driven by
three factors: the magnitude of harm; the extent to which the perpetrator is perceived
to have acted intentionally; and extenuating circumstances, such as provocation or
self-defense, that might mitigate the immorality of the act (Carlsmith 2006; Cushman
2015). This retributive pattern is broadly in line with a core expectation from evolu-
tionary theory, namely that punishment serves to inﬂict costs on actors who egoisti-
cally use force against others or exploit the cooperative behavior of others (Crockett,
Özdemir, and Fehr 2014).
2.2 Historical and cross-cultural variability
However, what is punished by criminal law also varies substantially across cultures
and over time. To illustrate the issues, we examined a convenience sample of seven
major state-organized historical cultures across the world. Table 1 summarizes the re-
sults. In line with the cross-cultural universalism hypothesis, they suggest that behav-
iors such as homicide, theft, and fraud were universally punished across this sample.
However, the table also comprises a considerable proportion of behaviors that are spe-
ciﬁc to one or several cultures (such as the emphasis on crimes against the social hier-
archy in Imperial China, or the criminal prohibition of alcohol consumption in Sharia
law). The table also shows that many historical cultures heavily criminalized several
large groups of behaviors that have almost entirely been dropped from modern West-
ern criminal law (Schwartz 1963). This includes sexual behaviors (adultery, homosex-
uality), offences against religion (blasphemy), and committing harm through magical
means (witchcraft).
Fewsystematic studies onperceived crime seriousnesshave includednon-Western
societies. An exception is the survey by Evans and Scott (1984), which comprised stu-
dent samples in Kuwait and the United States in the late 1970s. When comparing
the average seriousness rankings for 37 norm-breaking behaviors in both societies,
the authors found a small and non-signiﬁcant association (ρ = .264, n.s.). While there
was broad agreement on the relative seriousness of property, violent, andwhite-collar
offenses, large inconsistencies were found for moral offenses. For example, adultery
by amarriedwomanwas themost severe crime in Kuwait, but the ﬁfth least severe be-
havior in the United States, and the strength of religious beliefs predicted differences
between individuals in each society.
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Tab. 1: Serious crimes and major types of punishment: examples.
Civilization Behaviors considered crimes Punishments Source
Hammurabi
Code (1750 BC)
Murder, assault, cattle theft, buy-
ing stolen goods, harboring a run-
away slave, burglary, robbery,
kidnapping, incest, rape, slander,
false accusation, adultery, fraudu-
lent sale of drink
Death penalty, exile,
beating, branding, slavery,
ﬁne
Harper
(1904)
Ancient Egypt
(New Kingdom,
c. 1550–1069
BC)
Homicide, assault, robbery, theft,
tomb robbery, insult, slander,
adultery, incest, corruption, judi-
cial misconduct, treason, offenses
against the gods, blasphemy
Death penalty
(impalement,
decapitation, drowning),
beating, amputation,
slavery, branding,
imprisonment, ﬁnes
Müller-
Wollermann
(2004), van
Loon (2014)
Medieval Eng-
land (13th
century)
Felonies: Homicide, suicide, rob-
bery, larceny, burglary, rape, ar-
son, treason, forgery, serious as-
sault
Minor crimes: Assault, extortion,
abduction, minor theft
Death penalty (hanging) Hanawalt
(1979)
Islamic Cul-
tures (Sharia
Law)
Hudud (crimes against god): Drink-
ing alcohol, theft, highway rob-
bery, illegal sexual intercourse,
false accusation of illegal sexual
intercourse, apostasy
Qisas (crimes requiring blood
money): murder, assault
Ta’zir (discretionary offenses):
petty theft, attempted adultery,
homosexual contact, eating pork,
false testimony
Death penalty
(beheading), amputation,
ﬂogging
Peters
(2005)
Ancient China
(Qing Code,
17th century)
10 abominations: Rebellion, sedi-
tion, treason, harm or murder
one’s own parents and grandpar-
ents, depravity, great irreverence
(disrespect to the Emperor or his
family), lack of ﬁlial piety (mal-
treating one’s parents or grandpar-
ents), discord, unrighteousness
(murdering one’s superior, men-
tor, or local government officials),
incest
Also: witchcraft
Death penalty, beating
with heavy bamboo,
beating with light bamboo,
penal servitude, exile
Shahidullah
(2012)
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Tab. 1 (continued): Serious crimes and major types of punishment: examples.
Civilization Behaviors considered crimes Punishments Source
Tokugawa
Japan
(17th–19th
centuries)
Killing and wounding, theft, re-
ceiving or buying stolen goods,
kidnapping, blackmailing and ex-
tortion, arson, forgery, harboring
runaway servants, abandonment of
infants, adultery, gambling and the
holding of lotteries
Death penalty
(decapitation, cruciﬁxion,
burning at the stake),
deportation, banishment
Wren
(1968)
Aztec Empire
(15th century)
Homicide, perjury, adultery, theft,
fraud, bribery, treachery, embez-
zlement, witchcraft, drunkenness
Death penalty (hanging,
drowning, stoning,
strangulation, impaling,
beheading, burning,
quartering); exile,
restitution, loss of office,
destruction of home,
slavery, shaving of the
head
Avalos
(1994),
Berdan
(2008)
Notes: The list summarizesmajor crimes and punishments found in the literature.Minor types of delin-
quency are not included.
Criminal law also goes through often slow, but sometimes radical, change over time.
An example is the criminal code that Louis Michel le Peletier presented to the French
National Constituent Assembly in 1791, which proposed to abolish all “phony offenses
created by superstition, feudalism, the tax system, and [royal] despotism” (Martucci
2002). InspiredbyMontesquieuandBeccaria, it outlinedamore rational law limited to
the ‘true crimes’ against citizen’s rights in terms of public space, physical integrity, the
exchange of goods, and private property. Behaviors that had carried the death penalty
barely a century earlier – blasphemy, witchcraft, heresy, sacrilege, and same-sex ac-
tivities – were discarded and became a matter of private preference.
Peletier’s revolutionary ideas were part of a broader historical trend in percep-
tions of what deserves punishment. ‘Moral crimes’ (consensual sexual behaviors, ob-
scenity, promiscuity, adultery) and crimes against supernatural beings (blasphemy,
heresy, witchcraft) were gradually removed from the books across western society. At
the same time the protection of physical integrity was extended, possibly as part of
what Durkheim (1957) called the rise of moral individualism. It can be seen, for exam-
ple, in the elimination of provisions that allowed the top-down use of force against
subjects of authority including marital rape, the corporal punishment of children, or
the chastisement of wives, pupils, or apprentices (Pinker 2011).
Modern criminal law also embodies principles that have roots in the abstract uni-
versalism of modern political thought rather than in evolved intuitions. Especially,
the abstract idea that “all are equal before the law” is a powerful normative princi-
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ple of European liberal thinking. It probably squarely contradicts evolved intuitions.
Thus, Petersen et al. (2010) have proposed that human evolution should have shaped
punitive intuitions that take into account the value of the victim and the perpetrator
when assessing the wrongfulness of a crime. This is what one ﬁnds in hunter-gath-
erer societies, where the killing of group members considered unﬁt for survival (the
elderly, the injured, or the disabled) was often perceived as justiﬁable (Hoebel 1967).
Similarly, criminal law thinking in many state-organized historical societies graded
punishments by the social status of the perpetrator and the victim (Roth 2014). The
tariff tables of the early medieval Visigothic code of law, for example, show that as-
saulting a slave was punished less than attacking a free man, while a slave striking a
free person was a most serious crime (Scott 1910).
2.3 Accounting for stability and change
How strong is the evidence for cross-culturally universal intuitions about what consti-
tutes crime? It seems that some criminalizing beliefs can be found quite universally.
This includes thebelief that punitive sanctions aredeserved for unprovokedattacks on
physical integrity (assault, murder, rape), the appropriation of others’ property (theft,
robbery), the abuse of contractual obligations (fraud), and activities against the polity
(rebellion, sedition, treason). The punishment of fraud, theft and force, it appears,
constitute the universal core of criminal law.
In contrast, muchmore cross-cultural variation can be seen for a second group of
behaviors (Serajzadeh 2008; Wasserman 1983; West and Green 1997). This group en-
compasses transgressions against sexual propriety (adultery, fornication, incest, ho-
mosexual practices), reputational capital (insult, false accusation), religious beliefs
(blasphemy, sorcery, witchcraft), and the use of mind-altering substances (alcohol,
drugs).
Limited work has examined the sources of such variation. One argument follows
Durkheim (1893). It holds that a change in the set of punished behaviors mirrors
change in the inner qualities required for cooperation and social cohesion. Two such
qualities have been variously identiﬁed as essential in societies with only limited
state protection, namely ‘honor’ (Cohen and Nisbett 1994) and a shared belief in
moralizing gods (Norenzayan 2013). Cohen andNisbett (1994) argue that weak protec-
tion of property rights in herding societies universally leads to the rise of masculine
honor, feuding and revenge culture as a recognized counter-mechanism against pos-
sible exploitation by others (also see, e.g., Boehm 2011; Gluckman 1955). Norenzayan
(2013), in turn, has argued that a shared belief in moralizing gods played a pivotal
role for the development of cooperation among strangers in the ﬁrst large-scale so-
cieties, which could explain the widespread criminalization of behaviors harmful to
supernatural beings. The gradual ‘decriminalization’ of offensive behaviors against
morals, religious beliefs, and public reputationmayhence reﬂect long-term change in
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 19.08.19 10:32
68 | Manuel Eisner et al.
the basis of cooperation. In modern societies, cooperative behavior can be achieved
through contractual obligations in ways that are largely indifferent to the personal
moral quality of the participants.
3 The evolutionary basis of punishment
Themost basic expression of criminal law is centralized punishment, the inﬂiction of
unpleasant outcomes upon an individual on behalf of the polity (see Table 1). Punish-
ment systems developed in all larger societies with differentiated power structures,
and there are important cross-cultural commonalities in the types of cost imposed on
perpetrators. They include ﬁnancial compensation (ﬁnes); reputational damage (e.g.,
pillory, branding, degradation ceremonies); pain, mutilation, and death (e.g., whip-
ping, gougingout eyes, castration, amputationof extremities, stoning, boiling, drown-
ing, hanging, burning); ostracism (e.g., banishment, deportation and exile); and de-
privation of liberty (e.g., servitude, slavery and imprisonment) (Allen 2003; Berdan
2008; Miethe and Lu 2005; Roth 2014; Windrow 2006).
One approach to understanding the rise of state-led punishment applies behav-
ioral game theory models to evolutionary psychology. It assumes that punishment
uses psychologicalmechanisms such as anger, revenge or a sense of fairness, and that
thesemechanismswere sculpted by evolution in the service of promoting cooperation
whilst protectingagainst exploitation (e.g., deWaal andBrosnan2006;Haushofer and
Fehr 2008; Petersen et al. 2010). For example, Petersen et al. (2010:682) argue that
modern intuitions about criminal justice have been structured by “our evolved coun-
terexploitation psychology”.
3.1 Strong reciprocity and third-party punishment
Evidence for such an evolved counterexploitation psychology canbe found inwork on
‘strong reciprocity’ in experimental behavioral economics (Gintis 2000). Strong reci-
procity (or ‘altruistic punishment’) relates to the willingness by third parties to sacri-
ﬁce resources in both rewarding fair behavior and punishing unfair behavior, even if
this provides neither present nor future economic rewards for the reciprocator.
Strong reciprocity was ﬁrst identiﬁed in experimental studies in the late 1990s.
These studies examined how the involvement of a third party inﬂuences the extent
to which cooperation can bemaintained in iterated economic games (Fehr and Fisch-
bacher 2004; Fehr andGächter 2002; Gintis et al. 2008). The experiments usually com-
prised ultimatum games. In these games, one player (‘the proposer’) determines the
split of a ﬁnancial reward while a second player (‘the responder’) chooses to accept
or reject the proposer’s offer. If the responder refuses the offer, both players lose the
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entirety of the reward. In the third-party-punishment form of the game a third player
(‘the observer’) can use their resources to impose costs on the proposer.
Evidence from hundreds of variants of the game has led to two conclusions. Both
ﬂy in the face of economic rationality. First, responders tend to reject offers that are
‘unfair’ even when a rational cost-beneﬁt analysis suggests that they would be better
off accepting (Diekmann 2004). Second,when third-party players observe ‘unfairness’
(e.g., the proposer in the ultimatum gamemaking a very low offer to the receiver), they
are willing to expend some of their resources to reduce the welfare of the proposer,
even if they do not personally beneﬁt from doing so. The ﬁndings have been inter-
preted as signs of a deep-seated sense of justice: they suggest that humans are willing
to incur costs for the sake of inﬂicting punishment when they perceive allocations as
unfair, and they even behave like this if they are not directly affected by the injustice.
Seminal studies by Henrich et al. (2006) show that the desire to punish actors
whobehaveunfairly is a cross-cultural universal (Buckholtz andMarois 2012). Henrich
et al. (2006) conducted ultimatum and third-party punishment games in 15 societies
fromﬁve continents and representing a variety of economic and social systems. Across
all societies, the third-party players showed a willingness to punish highly unequal
offers, although the punishment was costly for them. However, the authors also found
that the average inclination to punish varied substantially between societies.
Other studies have examined the conditions under which cooperation can be
maintained in iterated public goods games. These are games where several players
make choices about the amount they wish to contribute to a shared ‘public’ pot, and
where the payoff is then evenly distributed to all players. Results from this research
suggest that the maintenance of cooperation depends on the facility for third-party,
respectively altruistic punishment. That is, participants in public goods games stop
cooperating if they cannot control the behavior of those who attempt to cheat the
system (Diekmann and Przepiorka 2015; Fehr, Fischbacher, and Gächter 2002; Her-
rmann, Thöni, and Gächter 2008). Conversely, cooperation can be maintained once
players are given the option of inﬂicting costs on cheaters. Non-cooperative strate-
gies will still be attempted, but the costs that self-interested players anticipate for
non-cooperative strategies means that cooperation can prevail.
Finally, behavioral experiments also shed light on the proximal psychological
mechanisms that trigger punishment. Fehr and Gaechter (2002) found that partici-
pants who failed to contribute their share to a public good elicited anger from other
players. Moreover, the intensity of that anger was proportional to the difference be-
tween the cheater’s contribution and the average contributions by the others. In
the framework developed by evolutionary psychologist Robert Trivers (1971), these
emotions can be thought of as representing ‘moralistic aggression’, feelings of anger
and retaliation in response to those who don’t reciprocate prior cooperative behav-
ior. Trivers proposed that “a sense of fairness has evolved in the human species as
the standard against which to measure the behavior of other people, so as to guard
against cheating in reciprocal relationships” (Trivers 1985). More recently, McCul-
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lough, Kurzban, and Tabak (2013) mapped out the details of such a ‘revenge system’
as a set of evolved psychological mechanisms that function to impose costs onwould-
be aggressors.
3.2 The emergence of sanctioning institutions
If criminal justice has roots in evolved cognitive-emotional processes that facilitate
third-party punishment, howcould suchmechanismsbecome institutionalized in sys-
tems with police officers, judges, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and prison officers
(Buckholtz and Marois 2012:657)? Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones (2007) proposed one
possible answer. They speculated that specialization may be attributable to different
skills within a society. Thus, a tendency to delegate punishment to specialists can
emerge from the human desire to see wrongdoers punished without wishing to indi-
vidually pay the costs of inﬂictingpunishment, coupledwith thepreference for ﬁnding
closure and peace following a conﬂict (Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones 2007).
Similarly, Cushman (2015) sees criminal justice as an example of institutional
exaptation. Exaptation is the process whereby a trait that originally evolved for one
purpose is later exploited for another. He argues that humans’ taste for retribution
and justice is largely innate, as it protects against exploitation. However, personally
engaging in punishment is risky because it can elicit cycles of retaliation and counter-
retaliation. Thus, criminal justice establishes an authority (a ‘social contract’) run by
specialists. It delivers third-party punishment based on explicit ex ante rules, while
drawing on psychological motivations that have evolved during our ancestral past.
One problem with this idea is what game theorists refer to as the second order
public good dilemma (Diekmann and Przepiorka 2015; Ostrom 2000). While criminal
justice addresses the ﬁrst order problem of exploitation by others, it creates a new,
second order problem of why actors should participate in the maintenance of this in-
stitutional mechanism.
Recent behavioral game theoretical experiments have begun to shed light on pos-
sible answers to this question (Diekmann and Przepiorka 2015; Gürerk, Irlenbusch,
and Rockenbach 2006; Zhang et al. 2014). For example, initial evidence supports
the idea that competition between groups with varying levels of punitive mechanism
could have played a role in the rise of sanctioning institutions. Gürerk, Irlenbusch,
and Rockenbach (2006) conducted a study where participants could choose between
playing an iterated public goods game in a sanction-free and non-punitive or a sanc-
tioning environment. In the sanctioning environment, after each round players are
informed of the contributions of the other players in their group, and they can then
use their tokens to positively or negatively sanction others. Initially most partici-
pants preferred a sanction-free institution. However, ultimately the entire population
of participants migrated to the sanctioning institution, where strong reciprocators
maintained cooperation.
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This suggests that societies with sanctioning mechanisms may do better than
those without. Diekmann and Przepiorka (2015) provide insight into a possible mech-
anism. They examined the role of individual differences in the ability (operationalized
as differences in costs) to punish freeriders. In a second-order public goods game (i.e.,
a game designed to understand the conditions under which actors contribute to the
maintenance of a sanctioning mechanism), they evaluated the impact of assigning
participants different costs of punishing others. They found that when administering
punishment was less costly for some participants, the other participants tended to
hand over the responsibility to those ‘punishment specialists’. Furthermore, groups
with an unequal distribution of punishment costs – amounting to a greater incentive
to ‘centralize’ punishment – performedbetter in terms of reducing cheating andmain-
taining cooperation than those with an egalitarian distribution of punishment costs.
These ﬁndings suggest that centralized punishment can emerge entirely through
endogenous processes. Diekmann and Przepiorka (2015) hence argue that the growth
of inequality and the emergence of coalitions of power-holders in the wake of the Ne-
olithic revolution may have created conditions ripe for the emergence of centralized
punishment, which in turn helped consolidate monopolies of violence and support
rent extraction. Criminal justice, then, may be so ubiquitous across large-scale civi-
lized societies because punishing institutions were necessary to facilitate successful
interaction among strangers in complex societies with a high division of labor.
There is, however, a problemwith this argument. Until the very recent past, crim-
inal justice institutions were weak and punishment was rare and unpredictable. Pro-
fessional policing, for example, is an invention of the 19th century (Emsley 1991). The
emergence of cooperation and trust in the ﬁrst complex societies thus likely required
additional mechanisms that punished cheaters and freeriders. In this vein, psycholo-
gist Ara Norenzayan (2013) has highlighted the importance of imagined punishment
by moralizing high gods. In his view, it wasn’t not just the punitive power of the state
that initially paved the path to cooperation; rather, the “Big Gods” of the religions that
emerged simultaneously with the rise of state-organized societies played amajor role.
Their all-knowing, all-powerful, and morally-concerned qualities made them excel-
lent third-party punishers that watched over human behavior and thus helped stabi-
lize cooperation in large groups. They ultimately dominated the cultural landscape –
according to Norenzayan’s (2013) cultural evolution argument – because belief in Big
Gods gave the believers a competitive edge over other groups.
3.3 Keeping punitive emotions at bay
The anthropological record suggests that ancient societies found dealing with obvi-
ous freeriders, psychopaths, or bullies relatively easy. If public shaming failed, death
penalties would be imposed and carried out by designated individuals (Boehm 2012).
The truly dangerous problem, it seems, were over-zealous second- and third-party
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punishers who would ruminate revenge against group members that had inﬂicted
prior harm. In fact, vengeance is a major motivating force behind homicide cross-cul-
turally with blood-feuds or similar types of self-redress found in 90% of the 186 soci-
eties in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (McCullough, Kurzban, and Tabak 2013).
Punishers do not always have the welcome effect of protecting a public good and
facilitating compliance. In sociology, Donald Black (1983) argued over 30 years ago
thatmuch crime is a formof punitive self-help: it often originates in a situation that the
perpetrator perceives as unfair or harmful, and the eventual ‘crime’ is frequently moti-
vated by thewish to take action against the perceived injustice. Empirical researchhas
since provided ample support for this idea. Some young people believe that it is “right
to ﬁght to protect your friends” or that “standing up to protect your rights” justiﬁes
getting into a ﬁght, and across the world they are more (not less) likely to break the
law (Ribeaud and Eisner 2015; Trajtenberg and Eisner 2014). They morally neutralize
their harmful behavior by restructuring it as private justice (Bandura et al. 1996), and
tend to be cynical about the rule of law, often claiming a private obligation to punish
wrongdoers (Nivette et al. 2014).
We illustrate the threat that peer-to-peer punishers pose with an example about
vengeful ruminations. The data come from the z-proso study, an ongoing longitudinal
study of 1675 young people who entered primary school in 2004 in the city of Zurich
(Eisner and Ribeaud 2005). We asked respondents when they turned 17 about their
violent fantasies during the past 30 days (Murray et al. 2016). Several items refer to
ideations of second- and third-party punishment, such as “paying back with violence
for something done to myself”, “paying back with violence for something done to
somebody I know”, or “killing somebody who has insulted my family or my friends”.
The ﬁndings show a deep gap between what people do and what they imagine
they might do. Switzerland has some of the lowest rates of violence in the world, but
fantasies about violent punishment arewidespread. Thus, one out of ﬁve (19%) young
people had recently fantasized about killing a person they knew; 26% had thought
about violently retaliating for harm done to somebody they knew; and 37% had
thought about violent payback for harm done to themselves. If young people carried
out the punishments they ruminated, Zurichwould quickly bewiped out in a civilwar.
We next explored a hypothesis about the triggers of vengeful ruminations. Thus,
evolutionary arguments lead us to expect that human brains generate virtual action
plans for violent retaliation, especially when the organism experiences ﬁtness threats
(Kenrick and Sheets 1993; McCullough, Kurzban, and Tabak 2013). We explored this
idea by examining the association between violent ideations and serious violent vic-
timization during the past year.
In line with predictions based on evolutionary theory, males were more likely to
have violent ruminations than females, irrespective of their victimization. Also, vic-
tims of violence ruminated more about second- and third-party retaliation than non-
victims. However, this effect was almost entirely limited to male respondents. For ex-
ample, male victims were more than twice as likely as non-victims to ruminate about
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Tab. 2: Percentage of adolescents aged 17 years with ruminations about violent second- and third-
party punishment in the past 30 days by sex and serious violent victimization in the last year.
Female (N = 647) Male (N = 657)
Thinking in the past 30
days about the following:
Non-
victim
Victim χ2 Non-
victim
Victim χ2
Violent pay-back for
something done to myself
22.3% 31.7% 1.94
[n.s.]
48.4% 83.3% 29.04**
Kill somebody who
insulted my family or
friends
6.6% 7.3% 0.03
[n.s.]
11.7% 22.7% 6.50*
Violent pay-back for
something done to
somebody I know
14.9% 26.8% 4.18* 34.0% 66.7% 27.08**
Kill another person 8.7% 6.3% 0.74
[n.s.]
14.7% 39.4% 25.39**
Note: Data fromWave 7 of the Zurich Project on the Social development of Children and Adolescents,
z-proso.
killing a person they knew (39% vs. 15%), while no difference could be found for
female victims. This suggests that a very substantial proportion of male victims of vi-
olence ruminate about retaliatory violence. These ruminations are not about fair and
proportionate justice. They are about the desire to kill.
Thankfully young people do not usually act on the violent ideations that are trig-
gered by threats to their reputation or physical integrity. One reason for this is a func-
tioning state. It controls would-be punishers by claiming a monopoly over the use of
violence. Thus, criminal justice institutions, with their emphasis on due process and
adherence to universal rules (i.e., the rule of law), are probably notmerely a functional
extension of third-party punishment. Rather, they also serve to control ancient puni-
tive impulses in increasingly complex societies. Conﬂict getting out of hand through
self-reinforcing cycles of violent punitive sanctions was a constant threat in ancestral
egalitarian groups. Modern criminal justice is designed to do the opposite and to im-
munize justice from the emotional processes and intuitions that may be part of our
evolutionary nature (Cushman 2015).
4 Procedural fairness and compliance with criminal
law
Criminal justice differs from private third-party punishment, and not just because it
is centralized. It differs mainly because of the formal procedures designed to identify
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suspects, establish guilt, and inﬂict punishment. In modern societies, every stage of
criminal justice from police arrest to sentencing and parole is exposed to public inter-
est about procedural fairness. Is the police racist? Do rapists get off without punish-
ment too often? Does prison fail to deter re-offenders because it is too soft? Is caning
inhumane? Etc.
Emerging evidence suggests that our emotional and moral preoccupation with
matters of fair procedure is not a recent phenomenon. Rather, fairness is critical for
the extent to which third-party punishment promotes cooperation, and the interest
in how the game is played may be rooted in our evolved psychology (Boehm 2012;
Bøggild and Petersen 2016).
4.1 Evolutionary roots of procedural fairness
Bøggild and Petersen (2016:256) recently proposed that the ancestral environment of
humans favored a keen interest in procedural fairness – mechanisms that regulate
how decisions come about. They argue that humans have a universal desire for fair-
ness, and that this desire reﬂects the ancestral problem of allocating leadership rights
to those individuals within a group that coordinate group efforts effectively andmain-
tain peace and cooperation among its members (Bøggild and Petersen 2016:256).
Fair procedure was most likely to be important when decisions had to be made
about punishment against somebody accused of a crime. Crimes are rarely transpar-
ent, and group members will often disagree about who did what. If no consensus is
found, the punishment risks producing conﬂict that can undermine future coopera-
tive behavior. Moreover, the moral quality of acts that entail inﬂicting harm on others
is not obvious. Inﬂicting harm could be an exploitative cheating strategy, and hence
a morally wrong ‘crime’; but it could also be a morally rightful punishment for prior
wrongful acts.
This problem is not always sufficiently recognized. Duntley and Shackelford
(2008), for example, argue that inﬂicting costs on rivals to gain control over their
resources is what deﬁnes crime. The problem is that inﬂicting costs on others is also
the essence of punishment. In fact, throughout human history, inﬂicting harm on
others could always be both things: wrongful acts of crime or rightful acts in response
to previous wrongs. Different parties would have had different self-serving views, and
the failure to address such conﬂicts could lead to antagonistic alliances that easily rip
a group apart (Boehm 2012).
The need to solve these problemsmay have created a pressure for the evolution of
the psychological mechanisms behind our interest in fair procedure, giving the rele-
vant parties an opportunity to be heard, estimating the impartiality of those who de-
liver judgment, and applying consistent procedures over time (Boehm 2012; Bøggild
and Petersen 2016; Bottoms and Tankebe 2012; Tyler 1990). This does not necessarily
require a rational process based on witnesses and evidence. Procedures that involve
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supernatural interference, such as trial by water or ﬁre, may have served exactly this
purpose. They helped to overcome the impasse that no human being could be trusted
to be free from conﬂicts of interest.
Few behavioral game theory experiments have examined the effects of procedural
fairness on cooperative behavior. One exception is a study by de Cremer andVanKnip-
penberg (2003). In this study, subjects played an iterated public goods game where
they decided how much of an endowment they wanted to contribute to a public pot.
In each round, a group leader decidedwhich groupmembers would receive a share of
the public pot, effectively punishing those who failed to contribute their share. In two
versions of the experiment, the authors manipulated two aspects of procedural jus-
tice. In the ﬁrst version, they manipulated the extent to which the group leader had
accurate information on the subjects’ contributions to the public good. In the second
version, the authors manipulated whether participants could voice their opinions be-
fore the leader decided on how to divide the pot. Findings showed that, among those
who were punished (i.e., receiving less than their equal share of the total sum), the
willingness to cooperate in future rounds was signiﬁcantly lower if the leader did not
have accurate information and if they were not given a voice in the decision-making
process.
Third-party punishment has a dark side. Experiments show, for example, that
some players use their punitive ability to take revenge on cooperative players for prior
punishment (Leibbrandt and López-Pérez 2011). Recently, Hilbe and Traulsen (2012)
presented ﬁndings from an evolutionary game-theory model that examined the emer-
gence of responsible punishment, in other words punishment strategies that are not
antisocial (i.e., harming cooperators), spiteful (i.e., harming everyone) or vengeful
(i.e., as a response to being punished). They showed that non-anonymity of the pun-
ishment decision may be a critical factor. More speciﬁcally, their models suggest that
responsible punishment dominates in conditions of non-anonymity because such
strategies confer reputational gains to the actors, making fair punishment a self-
interested act rather than an altruistic service to the community.
4.2 The signiﬁcance of legitimacy and procedural fairness
The legitimacy theory framework by Tyler (1990) and Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) as-
sumes that centralized punishment is more likely to maintain cooperation if it is legit-
imate and fair (Eisner and Nivette 2012; Nivette and Eisner 2012). In particular, a lack
of legitimacy (the right to rule, and the recognition by the ruled of that right: see Bot-
toms and Tankebe 2012) is expected to threaten cooperation and result in more crime
and violence.
The historical and anthropological record demonstrates howmuchhumans value
procedural fairness. Among theYurok, aNativeAmericanpeople inNorthwesternCali-
fornia, complex precautions were taken to ensure that the group handling legal cases
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was neutral and seen as legitimate (Hoebel 1942). Similarly, the payment of blood
money in contemporary South Sudan follows a complex legal procedure. It includes
foundational agreements, mechanisms for information-gathering and truth-telling,
careful selection of a mediating third party, examination of truces, compensation
agreements, closing rituals, and implementation measures (Wilson 2014). False accu-
sation is a chronic problem, the negative consequences of which were much feared
in early societies. Thus, the ﬁrst three of the 282 laws of the famous Law Code by
the Babylonian king Hammurabi (around 1750 BC) penalized reputation-damaging
activities (Harper 1904). The third law, for example, stated that “if any one bring an
accusation of any crime before the elders, and does not prove what he has charged,
he shall, if it be a capital offense charged, be put to death”. The message is clear:
Justice can be subverted by rumors and false accusations, and due process based on
evidence should characterize good justice.
In the contemporary world, countries differ in the extent to which their citizens
believe that the law is fairly applied, and that criminal justice is in the hands of those
who should have the authority to punish. Observational data suggest that a lack of
legitimacy signiﬁcantly erodes people’s willingness to comply with the law (Nivette
and Eisner 2012; Tyler 2006). Themediatingmechanisms are not well understood, but
evidence suggests that an important factor is procedural justice: that is, the perception
that the police and the courts are transparent, accountable, and fair (Jackson et al.
2012).
Unfortunately, there is a lack of consolidated experimental evidence on the ef-
fects of procedural fairness on cooperation in third-party punishment games. How-
ever, some experimental work conﬁrms that legitimate authority plays an important
role in sustaining cooperation (Hilbe and Traulsen 2012). Overall, this suggests that
bureaucratic criminal justice institutions are thus not merely a functional extension
of third-party punishment. What sets them apart is that citizens see punishment as a
rightful act delivered by legitimate authorities in a transparent and accountable man-
ner, based on the rule of law (Fehr and Gächter 2002).
5 A real-world example: the Peace of God movement
of the 10th and 11th centuries
Evolutionary psychology and behavioral game theory experiments lead to general
models of how criminal justice systems may have emerged. They are designed to pro-
vide a framework for understanding real-life historical dynamics. To illustrate this po-
tential, we brieﬂy examine one historical example, the Peace and Truce of God move-
ment of the 10th and 11th centuries (Cowdrey 1970; Head 1999; Head and Landes 1992).
This was a major initiative by the Church aimed at limiting the violence of feuding in
a society with hardly any central state authority. Its importance can hardly be overes-
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timated. It constitutes one of the earliest attempts to establish and enforce peace as
a public good, and is hence a critical moment in the process by which punishment
became gradually more concentrated in the hands of state monopolists, while other
protectionproviderswere eliminated (Spierenburg 1984; Tilly 1985;Weber [1922] 1978).
The Peace of God movement was launched by bishops in Aquitaine, south-west
France, around the year 1000, and spread across France in the following decades. It
was explicitly directed against the warrior elite, whose relentless local feuds meant
that they took ecclesiastical property by force, plundered agricultural resources from
peasants, and attacked unarmed clerics (Head 1999:655).
Against this background, thearchbishopofBordeauxcalled a council in 989 at the
abbey of Charroux to address the ‘criminal actions’ of the local nobility. The meeting
of the religious authorities resulted in a proclamation that used the most powerful
punishment the church had: it threatened the magnates with excommunication for
acts involving the plundering of churches, robbing the poor, or attacks on unarmed
clerics.
Over the following decades, the bishops developed an increasingly sophisticated
multi-tiered approach toward establishingpeace. They convoked councils attendedby
the leading moral authorities; they orchestrated an elaborate ritual drama by having
relics of saints ceremonially transported to the sites of the councils to provide divine
authority; and they attracted large crowds in open ﬁelds to generate a moral commu-
nity. Most importantly, they had members of the warrior elites publicly take oaths of
peace. These oaths, called ‘treuga dei’ (Truce of God), usually entailed a commitment
to renounce feuding and private warfare during days of peace, usually from Thursday
through Sunday and during religiously important periods. They became an important
center of legislative action, as the bishops enrolled the most inﬂuential public powers
in the administration, adjudication, and enforcement of the oaths (Cowdrey 1970).
The Peace of Godmovement largely lacked the means of physical coercion, and it
is unclear whether it effectively achieved a paciﬁcation of the warrior elites. However,
over the following two centuries the idea of proclaiming a peace that outlaws violence
– sometimes just for some days of the week or against some speciﬁed groups – was
coopted by the secular authorities. It eventually became, in the guise of the “King’s
Peace” (the ‘Landfrieden’ inGermany), a core elementof thenotionof sovereignpower
and a justiﬁcation for considering acts such as murder, rape or assault not as a matter
of private compensation but as a breach of the social contract and a reason for public
punishment (O’Brien 1999). At least in theory, these truce days were the ﬁrst moments
in European history where public authority claimed amonopoly on the legitimate use
of violence though the emerging criminal justice system (Spierenburg 2008).
The Peace of God movement is a fascinating example for the complex strategies
that contemporaries used to overcome aHobbesian situationwhere self-interested be-
havior by warrior elites led to cycles of revenge and continuous attacks against the
weak. Possibly in line with the arguments by Diekmann and Przepiorka (2015) about
the importance of power coalitions, themovement toward criminalizing elite theft and
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violence was begun by the most inﬂuential moral authorities of the day. As suggested
byNorenzayan (2013), it seems that themovement compensated for the lack of wordly
power by extensive reference to the punitive might of the moralizing Christian god
against those who break his peace. The Peace of God movement built the kind of pro-
cedural fairness into the peacemaking between feuding parties that de Cremer and
Knippenberger (2003) and Hilbe and Traulsen (2012) would lead us to expect: the lit-
erate clergy increased transparency by producing written records about occurrences,
punishments for past behavior, and oaths and peace agreements between magnates.
They held public councils with visible rituals of reconciliation to give the involved par-
ties a voice and promote responsible behavior, and they recorded contributions to the
public good, such as donations to monasteries as displays of cooperative intentions.
The Peace of God movement points to additional processes that would be useful
to examine theoretically. For example, from the onset the movement used powerful
ideological elements of the ‘Pax Romana’, the period of prosperity and peace that be-
gan with the reign of Augustus. Maybe this idea of a truce that overcomes anarchy
and solves the commons dilemmamay be interpreted as a ‘meme’, a cultural idea that
shaped the further development of legal thinking across the whole of occidental Eu-
rope (Richerson and Boyd 2008).
6 Conclusions
Recent work based on behavioral game theory experiments and evolutionary psychol-
ogy has crucially added to our understanding of the psychological underpinnings of
criminal justice. In this chapter, we have outlined three core questions that arisewhen
ﬁndings from macro-level comparative research are interpreted in the light of exper-
imental research in behavioral economics and sociology. First, we believe that the
historical and cross-cultural variability in what is considered punishable wrongdo-
ing requires a ﬂexible framework. Acts of fraud, theft and force, it appears, constitute
the universal core of behaviors that manifestly undermine human cooperation. They
are thus most likely to be proscribed as ‘crimes’, and sanctions are proportional to
perceived harm. At the same time, cultures differ signiﬁcantly in the extent to which
many other behaviors are considered wrongful and deserving of punishment by the
polity.
Second, we believe that seeing criminal justice primarily as a system that im-
poses costs on freeriders risks ignoring its important role in controlling peer punish-
ment and protection by private protection entrepreneurs. We have especially high-
lighted the problem that unchecked punishmentmay undermine rather than promote
cooperation. Third, we have identiﬁed the signiﬁcance of fair procedure and legit-
imacy as core characteristics that distinguish institutionally-anchored justice from
mere punishment. We therefore believe that behavioral experiments that model fair
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procedure could help better understand the long-term transition toward a centralized,
bureaucratic, and legitimate criminal justice system. Finally, believe that the well-
documented development of criminal justice institutions over the past 1000 years in
Europe offers interesting opportunities to test evolutionary arguments ‘in the wild’,
adding rich historical data.
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